This paper discusses liquidity regulation when short-term funding is the marginal funding source of credit growth but generates negative systemic risk externalities. It studies the relative merits of price versus quantity tools, showing that a second best solution may generally involve the use of both types of tools.
Introduction
The recent crisis has provided a clear rationale for regulation of banks' refinancing risk. This paper studies the effectiveness of different approaches to liquidity regulation.
Rapid expansion of credit can only be funded by attracting short-term funding but only at the cost of becoming vulnerable to refinancing risk in a confidence crisis, and be forced to sell assets at fire-sale prices. Because of fire sales or counterparty risk externalities, each bank's funding decision has an impact on the vulnerability of other banks, causing social losses. Even if the individual bank's funding decision is made taking into account the bank's exposure to refinancing risk, it will fail to internalize its system-wide implications (Perotti and Suarez, 2009 ).
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Liquidity risk externalities cause a wedge between net private value of short-term funding and its social cost. Absent regulation, in a competitive equilibrium banks will rely excessively on short-term funding.
We assess the performance of Pigovian taxes (aimed at equating private and social marginal costs) and quantity (ratio-based) regulations in the context of a model that stresses the fact that banks are heterogeneous and the regulator may be constrained in its ability to make regulations contingent on all relevant individual bank characteristics. Depending on these constraints and the dominant source of heterogeneity, the socially efficient solution may be attained with Pigovian taxes, quantity regulations or a combination of both.
The model recognizes that banks differ in their credit ability and their incentives to take risk. Banks earn decreasing returns to expand credit to their (monitored) borrowers, so better banks naturally lend more. Shareholders of less capitalized banks gain from investing in poor gambles, since they retain the upside and shift downside risk to the safety net (e.g. the deposit insurance provider). 2 To facilitate the discussion, we first analyze the impact of 1 In the model developed below we make the crisis costs faced by each bank (the convolution of the likelihood of a crisis and the expected losses incurred in it) an increasing function of systemic liquidity risk, which in turn is increasing in the refinancing risk adopted by all banks.
2 An alternative view is that gambling is driven by self-interested and overconfident managers, which view excessive risks as profitable, and are not properly controlled by shareholders, due to governance problems. regulation when either of these dimensions of heterogeneity operates in isolation. 3 When banks differ only in their credit assessment capability (or their investment opportunities), a simple flat-rate Pigovian tax on short-term funding, possibly scaled up by a measure of the systemic importance of each bank (e.g. to incorporate its contribution to counterparty risk), implements the efficient allocation. Liquidity risk levies allow better banks to lend more than others.
In this context, a net stable funding ratio or a liquidity coverage ratio (such as those proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in December 2009) improve over the unregulated equilibrium but are generally not optimal. An optimal quantity-based regulation would require precise measures of individual bank characteristics, likely unobservable. 4 A net stable funding ratio, by effectively imposing an upper limit on short-term debt, reduces overall liquidity risk, but redistributes liquidity risk across banks in an inefficient manner. The reduced systemic risk will actually encourage banks with relatively low credit ability (for whom the requirement is not binding) to expand, while banks with better credit opportunities will be constrained.
A liquidity coverage ratio which requires banks to (fractionally) back short-term funding with buffers of high-quality liquid assets may be ineffective. 5 When the yield on liquid assets equals the cost of short-term liabilities (roughly the case in normal times, at least prior to the crisis), a liquidity coverage ratio offers no liquidity risk improvement as there is no net cost to stacking liquidity. Banks will increase their short-term funding and their liquidity holdings enough to keep their "net" short-term funding (the difference) as high as in the unregulated equilibrium. The only effect is an artificial demand for liquid assets. Consequently, highquality liquid assets traditionally kept in money market mutual funds will end up kept by 3 The analysis and the results are fully consistent with the general discussion on prices versus quantity regulation made by Weitzman (1974) , among others. Our modeling emphasizes the role of heterogeneity in the cross-section of regulated banks rather than the role of the shocks to the demand and cost functions of a regulated producer.
4 Current policy discussions point to tying quantity requirements to measures of the "systemic importance" of each bank (size, interconnectedness, capitalization, etc.) but certainly not to measures of banks' credit opportunities.
5 Liquid assets which can be sold at no fire-sale loss in a crisis are essentially cash, central bank reserves, and treasury bills.
banks.
When the spread between liquid asset yields and bank borrowing costs is positive, a liquidity requirement operates as a tax on short-term funding. 6 In principle, by choosing the right requirement, the regulator may make such a "tax" work very similarly to the Pigovian tax in terms of banks' funding decisions and aggregate systemic risk, although the spread loss on the funds invested in liquid assets can be seen as a deadweight cost that the Pigovian arrangement does not have.
We next consider the second source of variation across banks, namely capitalization, charter value or any other determinant of risk-taking tendencies. It is well-known that low charter value banks may gamble to shift risk to the deposit insurance provider (Keeley, 1990) . It is easy to see that such gambling is not properly deterred by levies. Here, quantity constrains are more effective. Both short-term funding limits (e.g. a net stable funding ratio) and capital requirements can contain risk shifting by gambling banks, while levies will not be very effective-the most gambling-inclined banks will also be the most inclined to pay the tax and expand their risky lending. In this case, quantity instruments such as net funding ratios or capital ratios are best to contain excess credit.
Our analysis identifies the relative merits of price versus quantity instruments, and suggests that combining them may be adequate for the simultaneous control of gambling incentives and systemic risk externalities. If, as suggested in prior literature (e.g. Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000) , strengthening capital requirements is an effective strategy for the control of gambling incentives, the case for levies on short-term funding gets reinforced.
Other considerations may qualify the recommendation for the use of one instrument or the other. For instance, levies may be less costly to adjust than ratios. First, they might be easier to move for purely institutional reasons (e.g. if regulatory ratios are embedded in some law or international agreement while the levies are, at least partly, under control of a macroprudential authority). More importantly, changes in the levies may have better dynamic properties than changes in quantitative requirements in the presence of adjustment 6 The tax rate will equal the product of the buffer requirement per unit of short-term funding times the interest spread.
costs at bank level: they imply less of a concern on frictions that affect banks capability to adjust the quantities in their balance sheets on short notice. Similarly, changes in levies are less likely to induce procyclicality, since the Pigovian "tax rate" is directly controlled by the regulator rather than implicitly set by the interaction of some (controlled) quantitative requirement and the (freely fluctuating) market price of the required resource (namely, capital, liquid assets or stable funding). For preventive policy, controlling time varying liquidity risk may then be best achieved by a combination of stable ratios and variable levies.
[LITERATURE REVIEW TO BE WRITTEN]
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the baseline model. Section 3 characterizes the unregulated equilibrium. Section 4 finds the socially optimal allocation. In Section 5, we discuss the possibility of restoring efficiency with a Pigovian tax on short-term funding. Section 6 considers alternative quantity-based regulations. In Section 7 we analyze the implications of introducing gambling incentives as a second dimension of bank heterogeneity. Section 8 discusses further implications and extensions of the analysis. Section 9 concludes the paper.
The model
Consider a one-period model of a banking economy in which all agents are risk neutral.
The banking system is made up of a continuum of heterogenous banks run by their owners with the objective of maximizing their expected net present value (NPV). To start with, we assume that banks differ in a parameter θ that affects the NPV that they can generate using short-term funding, whose amount will be their only decision variable for the time being. 7 The parameter θ follows a continuous distribution with positive density f(θ) over the interval [0, 1] . Assuming w.l.o.g. that all banks of each class θ behave symmetrically, the short-term funding decision of each bank of class θ is denoted by x(θ) ∈ [0, ∞).
7 In Section 7, we introduce a second dimension of bank heterogeneity directed to capture differences in banks' gambling incentives.
We postulate that the expected NPV associated with a decision x by a bank of class θ can be written as
where X is a measure of the aggregate systemic risk implied by the individual funding decisions of all banks, π(x, θ) is the NPV generated if no systemic liquidity crisis occurs, and ε(x, θ)c(X) is the expected NPV loss due to the possibility of a systemic liquidity crisis. To facilitate the presentation, we assume a multiplicative decomposition of the expected crisis losses in two terms: the term ε(x, θ), which captures the purely individual contribution of the funding decision x and the individual characteristic θ to the vulnerability of the bank, and the term c(X), which captures the influence of other banks' funding decisions on systemic crisis costs.
We assume that π(x, θ) is increasing and differentiable in its two arguments, strictly concave in x, and with a positive cross derivative, π xθ > 0, so that a larger θ implies a larger capability to extract value from short-term funding. To guarantee interior solutions in x and monotone comparative statics with respect to θ, we also assume that ε(x, θ) is increasing, differentiable, weakly convex in x, and non-increasing in θ, and with ε xθ ≤ 0. Finally, we assume c(X) to be increasing, differentiable, and weakly convex in X.
A structural story consistent with this specification might be that π(x, θ) captures the profitability, in the absence of a systemic liquidity crisis, of using short-term funding to expand lending, ε(x, θ) captures the probability that the bank faces refinancing problems in a liquidity crisis and has to accommodate them by, say, selling its assets, and c(X) are the net liquidation losses incurred in such an event. Notice that c(X) might be increasing in X due to the impact on liquidation values of concurrent sales from troubled banks (e.g.
under some cash-in-the-market pricing logic or simply because the alternative users of the liquidated assets face marginally decreasing returns). 8 Here θ can be taken as a measure of a bank's credit ability or any other determinant of the marginal net value of its investments.
The key results below would be robust to essentially any specification of the aggregator X = g({x(θ)}), where {x(θ)} is the schedule of the short-term funding used by the banks in each class θ ∈ [0, 1] and we have ∂g/∂x(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ. For concreteness, however, we focus on the case in which aggregate systemic liquidity risk can be measured as the simple sum of all individual decisions:
In Section 8, we will discuss how to adapt our main results to the case in which banks also differ in a "systemic importance" factor that affects the weight of the contribution of their short-term funding to X.
We assume that all investors, except bank owners, have the opportunity to invest their wealth at exogenously given market rates and provide funding at competitive terms, hence obtaining a zero NPV from dealing with the banks. Then, the total NPV generated by banks (and appropriated by their owners) constitutes the natural measure of social welfare W in this economy. Formally,
Notice that the short-term funding decision x 0 of any bank of class θ 0 determines, via ε(x 0 , θ 0 ), the vulnerability of that very bank to a systemic crisis, and also, via c(X), the likelihood and/or costs of a systemic crisis to all other banks.
Equilibrium
In an unregulated competitive equilibrium each bank chooses x so as to maximize its own expected NPV, v(x, X, θ), taking X as given. So an unregulated competitive equilibrium is a pair ({x e (θ)}, X e ) that satisfies:
Let y(θ, X) be the value of x that satisfies the first order condition for an interior privately optimal choice of x given θ and X. This function is implicitly defined by:
Given the assumed properties of the relevant functions involved above, the implicit function theorem implies that y(θ, X) is increasing in θ and decreasing in X. Thus the equilibrium value of X can be found as the fixed point of the auxiliary function h(
which is continuously decreasing in X, implying, by standard arguments, that the fixed point
, if it exists, is unique. Existence only requires h(0) > 0. Furthermore, the existence of an "interior" equilibrium (with x e (θ) > 0 for all θ > 0) can be guaranteed by assuming that:
for a sufficiently large X. 10 This condition says that even in the presence of large funding risk, all banks (except perhaps those with the lowest valuation for short-term funding, θ = 0)
would have π x (0, θ) − ε x (0, θ)c(X) > 0 and, thus, be willing to obtain at least some small positive amount of short-term funding.
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For future comparison, let us notice that an interior equilibrium allocation will obviously
with
As shown below, the presence of systemic risk externalities will make the conditions defined by (6) incompatible with social efficiency.
The social planners' problem
The socially optimal allocation of short-term funding across banks can be found be maximizing social welfare W taking into account the influence of each individual bank funding 10 To obtain most of the results below, we need not constrain attention to interior equilibria, but dealing with the possibility of corner solutions involving x(θ) = 0 for some θ would make the presentation unnecessarily cumbersome.
11 Recall that we have assumed π xθ > 0 and ε xθ ≤ 0.
strategy on X. Formally, a socially optimal allocation can be defined as a pair ({x
that satisfies:
After substituting the constraint in the objective function, one can also find the social optimum as:
and, recursively,
The first order conditions that characterize the solution to the social planner's problem define the system of equations:
Relative to the conditions for individual bank optimization given in (6), the conditions in (9) add a third, negative term reflecting the marginal external costs associated with each x(θ). The cost relevant for a bank of class θ is made of two multiplicative factors: the average vulnerability of all the banks in the system to a systemic crisis, E z (ε(x * (z), z)), and the marginal effect of aggregate funding risk on systemic crisis costs, c 0 (X * ).
The assumptions adopted in Section 2 guarantee the existence of a unique socially optimal allocation. To guarantee that such an allocation is "interior" (satisfying x * (θ) > 0 for all θ > 0) we may need a condition tighter than (5). For instance, having π x (0, 0) → ∞ and finite derivatives with respect to x and X for the functions ε(x, θ) and c(X), respectively.
Clearly, the interior equilibrium allocation characterized by (6) does not satisfy (9) due to having both E z (ε(x e (z), z)) > 0 and c 0 (X e ) > 0. Even accounting for situations involving x * (θ) = 0 or x e (θ) = 0 for low values of θ, the following proposition can be generally established:
Proposition 1 The presence of systemic externalities associated with banks funding decisions, c 0 (X) > 0, makes the equilibrium allocation socially inefficient and characterized by an excessive aggregate funding risk X e > X * . Indeed, in an interior equilibrium, we have
Intuitively, the systemic externalities associated with banks' short-term funding decisions create a positive wedge between the social and the private marginal costs of using short-term funding. Banks only internalize the implications of the funding choices for their own vulnerability to refinancing risk, without considering their contribution to all other banks' systemic risk exposure and costs. Their standard marginal reasoning when privately optimizing on x make them choose an amount larger than socially optimal.
The Pigovian tax: an efficient solution
As in the standard textbook discussion on the treatment of negative production externalities, the social efficiency of the competitive equilibrium can be restored by imposing a Pigovian tax: by taxing the activity causing the externality at a rate equal to the wedge between the social marginal cost and the private marginal cost of the activity (evaluated, if applicable, at the anticipated socially optimal allocation). In our case, this will boil down to setting a flat tax per unit of short-term funding equal to
Obviously, the introduction of a tax on short-term funding will alter the first order condition relevant for banks' optimization in the competitive equilibrium with taxes.
Formally, we can define a competitive equilibrium with taxes {τ (θ)} as a pair ({x τ (θ)}, X τ )
satisfying:
1.
The first order conditions for the private optimality of each x τ (θ) imply
for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. And it is immediate to see that the flat tax schedule τ (θ) = τ * , with the tax rate defined as in (10), will make ({x τ * (θ)}, X τ * ) = ({x * (θ)}, X * ), implementing the socially optimal allocation as a competitive equilibrium.
To set the reference rate τ * properly, it is of course necessary that the regulator knows the functions that characterize the economy (including the density of the parameter θ that captures banks' heterogeneity) and is, hence, able to compute the socially optimal allocation that appears in (10).
An important practical difficulty when regulating heterogeneous agents is that the particulars of the regulation applicable to each agent may depend on information that its private to the agent. This problem does not affect the efficient Pigovian tax τ * , which is the same for all values of θ. The following proposition summarizes the key results of this section.
Proposition 2 When banks differ in the marginal value they can extract from short-term funding, the socially optimal allocation can be reached as a competitive equilibrium by charging banks a flat Pigovian tax τ * on each unit of short-term funding.
Other regulatory alternatives
Pigovian taxation is frequently described as a price-based solution to the regulation of externalities. Such description emphasizes the capacity of the tax solution to decentralize the implementation of the desired allocation as a market equilibrium. The polar alternative is to go for a "centralized" quantity-based solution in which each regulated agent (bank) is directly mandated to choose its corresponding quantity (short-term funding) in the optimal allocation (x * (θ) in the model).
In the context of our model, pure quantity-based regulation would require detailed knowledge by the regulator of individual marginal value of short-term funding for each bank (i.e., the derivatives π x (x, θ) and ε x (x, θ), which vary with θ and appear in (9)). Possibly due to the strong informational requirements that this implies, none of the alternatives for liquidity regulation considered in practice these days opts for directly setting individualized quantity prescriptions such as x * (θ).
The alternatives to Pigovian taxes actually under discussion are ratio-based regulations,
i.e. regulations that consist on forcing banks to have some critical accounting ratios above or below some regulatory minima or maxima. To be sure, some proposals include making the regulatory bounds functions of individual characteristics of each bank, such as size, interconnectedness, capitalization, etc. but none of the considered characteristics (except perhaps those referring to the regional or sectorial specialization of some banks) seem targeted to control for the heterogeneity in banks' capacity to extract value from short-term funding.
These qualifiers can be rather rationalized as an attempt to capture what, in an extension discussed in Section 8, we describe as the systemic importance of each bank (the relative importance of the contribution of its short-term funding to the systemic risk measure X).
The most seriously considered ratio-based proposals for the regulation of liquidity are those contained in a consultative paper of the BCBS on the topic issued in December 2009.
This document puts forward two new regulatory ratios: a liquidity coverage ratio, similar in format and spirit to one already introduced by the Financial Services Authority in the UK in October 2009, and a more innovative net stable funding ratio. To facilitate the discussion, we analyze each of these instruments as if it were introduced in isolation, starting with the last one, whose potential effectiveness for the regulation of funding maturity is somewhat less ambiguous.
A stable funding requirement
The net stable funding requirement calls banks to hold some accounting ratio of "stable funding" (i.e. equity, customer deposits, and other long-term or "stable" sources of funding)
to "non-liquid assets" above some regulatory minimum. To translate this to our model, where banks' assets and stable sources of funding have been so far taken as exogenously fixed, we can think of this requirement as equivalent to imposing an upper limit x to the short-term debt that the bank can issue. In a more general version of our model, the effective upper limit applicable to each bank could be considered affected by prior decisions of the bank regarding the maturity and liquidity structure of its assets, its retail deposits base, its level of capitalization, etc. But here, for simplicity, one can see these issues as a possible interpretation of the comparative statics of x.
The introduction of a minimum stable funding requirement has then the implication of adding an inequality constraint of the type x ≤ x to the private optimization problem of the banks. Formally, a competitive equilibrium with a stable funding requirement parameterized by x can be defined as a pair ({x x (θ)}, X x ) satisfying:
Since the preference for short-term funding is strictly increasing in θ, we may have up to three possible configurations of equilibrium. For x ≥ x e (1), the stable funding requirement will not be binding for any bank (since θ = 1 identifies the banks with the highest incentives to use short-term funding), and the equilibrium will then coincide with the unregulated competitive equilibrium characterized in Section 3. For x ≤ x e (0), the stable funding requirement will be binding for all banks (since θ = 1 identifies the banks with the lowest incentives to use short-term funding), implying x x (θ) = x < x e (θ) for all θ and, hence,
1)), the stable funding requirement will be binding for at least the banks with the largest θs and perhaps for all banks. To see the latter, notice that inducing the limit choice of x x (θ) = x < x e (θ) to the banks with relatively large θs will push X x below X e , but this, in turn, will push the banks with relatively low θs into choices of x x (θ) > x e (θ), possibly (but not necessarily) inducing some or even all of them to also hit the regulatory limit x.
It is then obvious that, in general, a sufficiently tight stable funding requirement x < x e (1)
can reduce the equilibrium measure of aggregate systemic risk X x relative to the unregulated equilibrium X e , thus moving it closer to its value in the socially optimal allocation X * . The induced allocation will, however, be necessarily inefficient. The reason for this is that the reduction in the activities that generate negative externalities comes at the cost of distorting the allocation of short-term funding across bank classes: (i) constraining the banks with relatively higher valuation for short-term funding to the common upper limit x, and (ii) encouraging the banks with relatively low valuation for short-term funding to use more of it than it would be socially optimal (since they will choose
for all θ). In fact, there is no guarantee that introducing a x that simply bring X x closer to X * improves, in welfare terms, over the unregulated equilibrium.
Proposition 3 A binding net stable funding requirement will affect the measure of aggregate systemic risk X in the same direction as the efficient arrangement (i.e. will reduce X) but it will also redistribute short-term funding inefficiently from banks that value it more to banks that value it less, so that the socially optimal allocation cannot be reached and the improvement in social welfare is not guaranteed.
The socially optimal choice of x (i.e. the "second best" allocation attainable if x is the only available instrument for liquidity regulation) can be defined as follows:
where θ satisfies y(θ, X x ) = x, the function y(θ, X) is defined as in (4), and F (θ) is the cumulative distribution function associated with f (θ).
The first order conditions that characterize an interior solution to the above second best social planner's problem can be written after some algebra (and after taking the constraint of the problem and the definition of y(θ, X) into account) as
where dX
To gain some intuition on the trade-offs behind the socially optimal choice of x, it is convenient to compare (13) with the condition for first best efficiency in (9). First, (9) applies point-wise, defining an efficient x * (θ) for each θ; in contrast, (13) is just one equation that determines a common x trading off costs and benefits that are "averaged" over all the θs.
The terms in the integral that appears in (13) resemble the first two terms in the left hand side of (9), but the ones "averaged" here correspond to the set of high θs only, for which the requirement x is binding. 12 The second term in (13) and the third in (9) reflect the marginal externality caused by changing x and each x * (θ), respectively. The relevant difference is due to the presence of dX x /dx in (13): as shown in (14), this term captures the fact that raising
x increases by the same amount the short-term funding of the constrained banks (whose proportion 1 − F (θ) < 1 appears in the numerator) but has the partially offsetting effect of reducing (in response to the very rise in X x ) the use of short-term by the unconstrained banks (which explains the denominator, where y X < 0).
This comparison evidences the rather limited second best nature (relative to the efficient, flat Pigovian tax) of the regulatory solution based on establishing a stable funding requirement.
A liquidity requirement
The liquidity coverage ratio described by the BCBS in December 2009 requires banks to back their use of short-term funding with the holding of high-quality liquid assets, i.e. assets that could be easily sold, presumably at no fire-sale loss, in case of a crisis. In its original description this requirement responds to the motivation of providing each bank with its own liquidity buffer, which, presumably might also expand the liquidity available in the system in case of a crisis (on top of that possibly provided by the lender of last resort).
Specifically, it is proposed that banks estimate the refinancing needs that they would accumulate if the functioning of money markets or other conventional borrowing sources were disrupted for some specified period (one month) and keep enough high-quality liquid essentially be cash, central bank reserves and treasury bonds.
How can we capture this requirement in the context of our model? Leaving details aside, the liquidity requirement can be seen as a requirement to back some minimal fraction φ < 1 of each bank's short-term funding x with the holding of qualifying liquid assets m, thereby introducing the constraint m ≥ φx. Additionally, the impact of m on the banks objective function could be taken into account by considering the following extended value function:
where 14 In this extended framework, social welfare can be written as:
where the presence of −δm(θ) implies considering banks' direct costs of holding liquidity as a deadweight loss.
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A competitive equilibrium with a liquidity requirement parameterized by φ can be defined
It is immediate to see that the liquidity requirement can be taken as generally binding 
We will proceed with the analysis by looking first at the case in which the net cost of holding liquid assets is zero (δ = 0) and then at the case in which it is positive (δ > 0).
The case in which holding liquidity is costless (δ = 0)
The following proposition establishes a somewhat shocking result for the relevant case in which the spread δ is zero (roughly the case in "normal times", when banks are perceived as essentially risk-free borrowers):
Proposition 4 With δ = 0, the competitive equilibrium with a liquidity requirement φ < 1 involves the same amount of net short-term funding and, hence, the same level of systemic risk as the unregulated equilibrium. That is, it involves x φ (θ) − m φ (θ) = x e (θ) and b
The proof of this proposition follows immediately from the equivalence, when δ = 0, between the equilibrium conditions for ({b x φ (θ)}, b X φ ) and those for ({x e (θ)}, X e ) (see Section 3). Hence, the only effect of the liquidity requirement relative to the unregulated equilibrium is to induce an artificial demand
) for the qualifying liquid assets and a spurious increase in banks' "gross" short-term funding, which becomes
Therefore, when the direct net cost δ of each unit of liquidity that the requirement forces banks to hold is zero (not implausible in "normal times"), the liquidity coverage ratio totally fails to bring the equilibrium allocation any closer to the socially optimum than in the unregulated scenario. Banks respond to regulation by increasing their short-term funding and their liquidity holding so as to make their "net" short-term funding as high as in the unregulated equilibrium. The artificial demand for high-quality liquid assets may imply that liquid assets kept somewhere else in the financial system (e.g. money market mutual funds)
prior to imposing the ratio end up kept by banks after imposing the ratio. However the systemic risk generated by the banks does not change.
The case in which holding liquidity is costly (δ > 0)
When the direct net unit cost of holding liquidity, δ, is positive, the implications are quite different. The equilibrium conditions for ({b x φ (θ)}, b X φ ) become analogous to those associated with a competitive equilibrium with taxes in which τ (θ) = For a given δ > 0, the implicit "tax rate" described above moves from zero to infinity as the liquidity requirement φ moves from zero to one. Thus the regulator can seemingly replicate the effects of any flat tax (including the efficient Pigovian tax τ * of Section 5)
by setting φ = τ δ+τ . However, banks' demand for the qualifying liquid assets would be
and their gross short-term funding would be
at the aggregate level). Importantly, the total direct net costs of holding liquidity would cause a deadweight loss of δm φ (θ) = τx τ (θ) to each bank. Not surprisingly, the aggregate deadweight loss δM φ = τX τ equals the tax revenue that the "replicated" tax on short-term funding could have raised.
The presence of the deadweight loss τ * X * implies that the liquidity requirement that seemingly replicates the Pigovian solution (φ * = τ * δ+τ * ) is not socially efficient.
Proposition 6 With δ > 0, replicating the net short-term funding allocation and aggregate systemic risk of the efficient allocation using a liquidity requirement φ * = τ * δ+τ * is feasible, but entails a deadweight loss τ * X * > 0.
Actually, φ * will not generally be optimal even from a second best perspective. Except in the non-generic situation in which the efficient Pigovian tax τ * happens to be at a critical point of the Laffer curve τX τ . This is because moving the liquidity requirement marginally away from φ * (in one direction) will reduce the deadweight loss δM φ , while other components of social welfare will not change (since they are maximized precisely with φ = φ * ).
For a given spread δ > 0, the socially optimal liquidity requirement will be some φ SB = τ SB δ+τ SB whose associated "implicit tax rate" τ SB satisfies:
The formulation of this optimization problem exploits the analogy explained above, which conveniently allows us to write the deadweight loss suffered by each bank as τx τ (θ), which is actually independent of δ and will end up making the solution τ SB also independent of δ. Notice that the constraints in the optimization problem are simply the conditions that define an equilibrium with a tax τ on short-term funding (see Section 5).
Typically, the optimal liquidity requirement φ SB will be inferior to φ * , implying more short-term funding for each bank and, hence, more aggregate systemic risk than in the first best allocation. The intuition for this is that moving away from the unregulated equilibrium allocation by increasing φ will typically monotonically increase the aggregate deadweight loss δM φ , while the remaining marginal benefits of moving towards the first best allocation decline towards zero as φ approaches φ * .
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Interestingly, the writing of the problem as in (18) makes clear that τ SB does not depend on δ, implying that the total variation of φ SB = τ SB δ+τ SB with respect to δ is just given by the partial derivative ∂φ
Hence, if the regulator wants to implement the second best allocation described above (or to seemingly replicate the efficient Pigovian tax), it should be ready to move the imposed liquidity requirement φ SB (or φ * ) in response to the fluctuations in the spread δ. In practice, moving φ and the implied adjustments in quantities may be a source of trouble. On the one hand, authorities will have to be effective in changing φ in due course. On the other hand, frequent and sudden changes φ might produce changes in M φ that, for reasons left outside the model (such as monetary stability) might not be admissible. This might be especially so if δ approaches zero, in which case the prescriptions for φ SB (or φ * ) imply that M φ would tend to infinity.
These last predictions suggest, however, that treating δ as exogenously given (as we did so far) might not be appropriate for, at least, the last type of discussion. The high demand for liquid assets and the large gross short-term borrowing needs of the banks that follow the increase in φ might eventually produce upward pressure on δ, so that the limit with δ = 0
is not relevant for the implementation of φ SB (or φ * ). Looking at the situation in which δ is endogenously determined in equilibrium by the interaction of demand and supply (in the markets for liquid assets and banks' short-term debt) constitutes a possible interesting extension of our analysis. 16 The result might be reversed if δM φ became decreasing in φ somewhere before reaching φ * .
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In this section we extend the model to address formally one of the main criticisms to the proposal of a Pigovian approach to liquidity risk regulation. Such criticism is based on the "robustness" of the price-based approach to modeling mistakes and, specifically, to the possibility of having some "crazy" or just particularly risk-inclined banks that, for the sake expanding their risky lending are willing to pay large amounts of the established tax so as to use large amounts of short-term funding.
In our baseline formulation, banks that like to take more short-term funding are those that can extract more expected NPV from it. In such formulation, the considered dimension of heterogeneity makes banks with larger θ essentially more valuable, privately and, if properly regulated, also socially. We will now denote that dimension of heterogeneity by θ 1 and introduce a second dimension of heterogeneity, θ 2 ∈ [0, 1], intended to capture differences in banks' inclination towards risk-taking. The joint distribution of (θ 1 , θ 2 ) will be described by the density function f(θ 1 , θ 2 ).
The corporate finance and banking literatures have identified several possible sources of such differences. For instance, corporate governance arrangements may affect the severity of the conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders, making the former more or less capable to ex post expropriate the former by shifting risk (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 ). In the case of banks, risk-shifting problems are exacerbated by the existence of safety net guarantees (e.g. deposit insurance) provided at not perfectly risk-sensitive fair prices.
It is well known that, in such a setup, banks' charter values tend to moderate excessive risk-taking (Keeley, 1990) . Capital requirements (especially if risk-based) generally improve the alignment of incentives between the bankers and other stakeholders (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) and can specifically attenuate the risk-shifting problem (Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000) .
To capture heterogeneity in banks' risk-shifting inclinations formally, we are going to treat θ 2 as a parameter that determines the fraction of the losses incurred by a bank during a crisis which are not internalized by its owners but passed (without compensation) to other stakeholders (e.g. the deposit insurer). We then assume each bank, when privately deciding on x, only considers the fraction 1 − θ 2 of ε(x, θ)c(X) as an expected value loss, leaving the remaining fraction θ 2 to other stakeholders. Hence, the social welfare measure W ({x(θ)}) must now explicitly consider, in addition to the NPV appropriated by the bank owners, the losses −θ 2 ε(x, θ)c(X) passed on to other bank stakeholders.
So the new objective function for banks is:
while social welfare is given by:
where
Plugging (19) into (20), social welfare can be written as
which is conceptually identical to (3).
Gambling as the sole source of heterogeneity
To highlight our key argument, suppose that the variation due to θ 1 , whose implications we have already discussed in prior sections, is shut down by fixing θ 1 = θ 1 for all banks.
So residual bank heterogeneity is due to θ 2 only. How is the unregulated equilibrium determined? And the socially optimal allocation? How do they differ? How should x(θ 2 ) be regulated?
Without restating all the relevant definitions (which will follow mechanically from the adaptation of those already presented for the baseline model), the answers to the questions above can be found by comparing the first order conditions satisfied by bank decisions, x ee (θ 2 ), and the systemic risk measure, X ee , in an interior unregulated equilibrium, with the conditions satisfied by their counterparts, x * * (θ 2 ) and X * * , in an interior socially optimal allocation. Similarly to (6), the unregulated equilibrium objects satisfy:
while, similarly to (9), in the socially optimal allocation we must have:
in both cases for all θ 2 . From these conditions, it is immediate to conclude that
is increasing in θ 2 (that is, banks with greater risk-shifting inclinations tend to use more short-term funding) while x * * (θ 2 ) is independent of θ 2 and, hence, equal to a constant x * * (since, for any given x, θ 2 determines the distribution of value across bank stakeholders but not the total marginal value of short-term funding).
By simple comparison of the two sets of conditions, it is now obvious that the efficient Pigovian tax schedule is
where the first term is new relative to (10) and reflects that risk shifting incentives produce additional discrepancies between the private and social costs of expanding banks' short-term funding. In contrast to the pure systemic externality term (identical to what we had in the baseline model), the first term depends on θ 2 . Hence, the efficient Pigovian tax schedule is not flat and cannot be enforced without detailed knowledge of each bank's risk-shifting inclination. A flat tax on short-term funding will not implement the first best allocation. Now, however, proper quantity regulation can do a great job. Specifically, a net stable funding requirement that effectively imposes the first best quantity x * * as a limit to each bank's use of short-term funding would implement the first best. It is easy to see that the regulatory constraint will be binding for all θ 2 . As for liquidity requirements, the rather negative conclusions obtained in the baseline analysis would still apply: with δ = 0, a liquidity requirement is as ineffective as it was there, while with δ > 0 its effect is very similar to (but has worse welfare properties than) a flat tax on short-term funding. And a flat tax on short-term funding is not a good solution in this environment! Proposition 7 If gambling incentives constitute the only source of heterogeneity across banks, a stable funding requirement x = x * implements the socially efficient allocation while no flat-rate tax on short-term funding can do it. A liquidity requirement has the same shortcomings as in the baseline model and is, then, either ineffective (if δ = 0) or very similar (but with larger deadweight costs) than the flat-rate tax solution (if δ > 0).
Generalizing the analysis
The analysis of the general case in which both θ 1 and θ 2 exhibit significant variation across banks is complicated and unlikely to yield very clear-cut results, if anything because first best efficiency will not be generally attainable using instruments that are not explicitly contingent on θ 1 or θ 2 . The analysis of simple instruments will necessarily be based on their second best performance.
Using a continuity argument and building on the polar cases already analyzed above, we can say that a flat tax on short-term funding will tend to perform better than a stable funding requirement if θ 1 is the dominant source of heterogeneity, i.e. if it has ample variation and, specifically, sufficient density at its upper tail, producing sufficiently many banks with value-generating motives to use short-term funding at a larger scale. The opposite will be true if θ 2 is the dominant source of variation, in this case producing sufficiently many banks whose main reason for wanting to use short-term funding at large scale is risk-shifting. For instance, if the banking system had a small group of gambling banks and an ample majority of non-gambling banks, a stable funding requirement might be helpful to control the otherwise excessive short-term funding that the former would like to use.
But, continuing with the example, one can also anticipate possible advantages from combining the instruments. Suppose, in particular, that there were some additional diversity due to θ 1 that affects, mainly, the banks in the non-gambling group. Then it might be socially valuable to introduce a complementary tax on short-term funding so as to further graduate the contribution of this group of banks to systemic externalities.
Going beyond the pure regulation of short-term funding, capital requirements-the most important regulatory instrument in banking-can be seen as a way to directly influence gambling incentives and, hence, the distribution of θ 2 . Strengthening capital requirements, by ensuring shareholders internalize a larger part of the lower tail of the returns generated by the banks, will tend to shift the probability distribution of θ 2 towards lower values, making it more concentrated. This allows us to predict that in a scenario with stronger capital regulation there is greater room for having a tax on short-term funding as part of the second best regulatory mix.
8 Discussion and robustness
A parametric example
It is possible to obtain closed-form solutions for the equilibrium and the socially optimal allocations under the following parameterization of the baseline model (i.e. where heterogeneity refers to the profitability of short-term funding):
π(x, θ) = (a 0 + a 1 θ) log x, with a 0 À 0 and a 1 > 0, ε(x, θ) = (ε 0 + ε 1 θ)x, with ε 0 + ε 1 ≥ 0 and ε 1 ≤ 0, where a 0 À 0 is imposed so as to guarantee interior solutions for x(0) (and hence for all x(θ)) in the equilibrium, the socially optimal, and any other relevant allocation.
Parametric examples of this sort would allow us to produce pictures to illustrate the main results. It would also allow us to assess, at least numerically and in the context of the baseline model, the second best performance of a net stable funding ratio and a liquidity coverage ratio relative to the efficient Pigovian tax.
The example might also be extended to deal with heterogeneity in risk-shifting incentives as in Section 7. Explicit examples of dominance of a stable funding requirement over a flat tax on short-term funding (or vice versa) or of the (second best) optimality of using a combination of both instruments might be provided.
[THIS SECTION IS INCOMPLETE]

Dealing with heterogeneity in systemic importance
Suppose that factors such as interconnectedness, lack of susbtitutability, centrality or size makes some banks more "systemically important" than other in the very sense that the per-unit contribution of their short-term funding to the systemic risk measure X is larger than for other banks. Suppose in particular that systemic importance is captured by a new dimension of heterogeneity θ 3 which only enters significantly into the equations of the economy through the following extended measure of systemic risk:
where w(θ 3 ) is the systemic risk weight of the banks of class θ 3 .
Extending our characterization of competitive equilibria (unregulated or with taxes) and the socially optimal allocation to deal with this case is immediate. Moreover, it can be shown that decentralizing the socially optimal allocation as a competitive equilibrium with taxes will only require setting τ (θ 3 ) = τ * w(θ 3 ), where τ * = E z (ε(x * (z), z))c 0 (X * ) is a reference rate set exactly like in (10), except because z should now be interpreted as the vector (z 1 , z 3 ) of individual bank characteristics. So the presence of heterogenous systemic importance simply leads to the need to consider each bank's systemic importance measure w(θ 3 ) in scaling up the reference tax rate τ * . But τ (θ 3 ) preserves the key property of being not directly dependent on the individual value of each bank's lending opportunities as measured by θ 1 .
Other issues
[TO BE WRITTEN]
Conclusions
We have developed a formal analysis of the relative performance of realistic price-based and quantity-based approaches to the regulation of systemic externalities associated with banks' activities undertaken by the banks using this funding is heterogeneously distributed across banks (or, similarly, over time), a Pigovian tax on short-term funding will dominate a net stable funding ratio or a liquidity coverage ratio. If some (poorly capitalized or low charter value) banks have strong gambling incentives and expand their activity as a way to shift risk to outside stakeholders (e.g. the deposit insurer), quantity requirements may have better properties. In general terms, an optimal regulatory design may combine price and quantitybased instruments, and the emphasis on each of them will depend on what is the dominant dimension of heterogeneity across banks (or variation over time)
